On the rewarding facet is the client that has been underserved by other agents and somehow involves you for help. The Court said that while it could seem that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter despatched to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation regarding the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as in opposition to the claim of respondent’s client. In using phrases resembling « lousy », « inutile », « carabao English », « stupidity », and « satan », the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and repute of respondent as a lawyer which uncovered him to ridicule. The phrases as written had only the effect of maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as authorized officer within the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for thus a few years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the identical company and likewise a notary public. Needless so that you can cite particular provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the identical is irrelevant to the present case.

Applying by analogy the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 and Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which laid down a rule of choice in the applying of the penalties provided for in B.P. Any of the imputations coated by Article 353 is defamatory; and, underneath the final rule laid down in Article 354, « every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it’s shown ». The Court held that since the letter is just not a privileged communication, « malice is presumed » underneath Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides « every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown », besides in the next instances: « (1) a personal communication made by any particular person to another in the efficiency of any authorized, ethical, or social responsibility; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or different official proceedings which aren’t of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of another act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions ».

This content was generated by Công ty xây dựng.

The Court stated that with a view to show that a press release falls throughout the purview of a qualified privileged communication beneath Article 354, công ty xây dựng cà mau No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the next requisites must concur: (1) the one who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social responsibility to make the communication, or not less than, had an interest to protect, which interest might either be his personal or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the facility to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and with out malice. May we remind you that any try in your part to continue harassing the particular person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. The letter was crafted in an injurious approach than what is critical in answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and exhibiting malicious intent on petitioner’s part.

He by no means knew respondent prior to the demand letter despatched by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. The Court was not persuaded by the argument of the petitioner that his letter was a personal communication made within the efficiency of his « moral and social obligation as the attorney-in-truth of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate » where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the character of a privileged communication and never libelous. Gauging from the above-mentioned assessments, the phrases used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 despatched by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the topic letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself. Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all involved. On that same day, Atty. Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty.